Tuesday, October 23, 2012
Update: Yahoo! Inc.
Yahoo! Inc. Q3 2012 data is out, and to everyone's surprise, Yahoo beat earnings. The stock jumped almost 4% after-hours yesterday, and is currently trading at $16.68/share. Here's a look at what happened.
Revenue growth year to year for Q3 hasn't changed much, up or down 1-2% depending on GAAP or non-GAAP methods used. In fact, Yahoo's income from operations is down more than 14% year to year, but much of this can be attributed towards increased restructuring costs. Although Mayer is attempting to portray a company in the midst of turn-around, the numbers just aren't there. The 2% revenue growth quoted by most news websites is the non-GAAP ex-TAC revenue, not the GAAP revenue. Furthermore, quarter to quarter revenue has shown 0% growth.
The biggest shock, which seemed evident to many in hindsight, is Yahoo's $4.75b in "other net income" reported this quarter. It doesn't take a genius to realize that Yahoo has just reported their proceeds from the Alibaba sale as income.
What does this mean for prospective investors? First and foremost, it means that Marissa Mayer wants the attention of the street back, and is willing to pay for it. Furthermore, it signals that the stock is in for another major rally when the second half of Yahoo's stake in Alibaba is announced to be sold. Whereas previously, investors may have been wary about what exactly Yahoo would be doing with the proceeds, it is now clear.
Now is a great time to buy. The price movement yesterday was reactionary, but we know a similar case will be coming in the near future. The difference is that next time investors will not wait for the earnings report to buy, but react immediately to the announcement of the sale, so we have to get in before that happens.
On the technical side, both the MACD and the Fast Stochastic have just crossed upwards, and the stock has broken through its Bollinger Band on the top side.
VERDICT: Buy
Monday, October 22, 2012
Pandora Media Inc.
Highlights
I.
Pandora may seem cheap, but the
company has no history of earnings, no real assets, and no compelling story for
a turnaround.
When Pandora IPO’d back in June of
2011, I told my college investment club that there was a mini tech bubble occurring
within the recent slew of internet company IPOs, most notably Facebook and
Zynga. Since its initial $16/share price
valuation, the stock has plummeted to $9/share as of today (10/22/12), with
significant institutional sell-offs in March and late August of 2012.
Pandora’s business model is simple: users on a computer or mobile device can
create music “stations” by entering an artist or song name. Free users experience both audio and video
ads, interspersed between songs. Paid
users do not. Pandora’s two main streams
of revenue are ads revenue, and subscriptions revenue.
Because Pandora has only recently
become a public company, there is a lack of credible annual data. However, because Pandora is not a seasonal
company, I felt comfortable comparing consecutive quarterlies. To be certain, Pandora is not a value
play. With no record of positive net
income, the company has been losing money since IPO. Pandora’s current ratio is 1.91 with a debt:
equity ratio of 0.96, so there should be no liquidity problems.
The two main problems for Pandora’s
bottom line are content acquisition costs, which have increased almost 100% year
to year for Q2 since 2011, and marketing and sales, which have increased
roughly 62% for the same time period. For
the extra $36m that Pandora has spent on these two accounts during Q2 2012 as compared to Q2 2011, the
company has seen an increase in total revenue of only $34.4m. Fundamentally, these two problems are symptoms
of much larger problems.
Pandora
owns no physical assets, and is specialized based on its music selection
algorithm, which admittedly is pretty good.
However, this is not enough of a niche for Pandora to be completely
diversified from competitors such as iTunes and Spotify. In fact, free users of Spotify can listen
directly to the songs they want to instead of creating stations around the
songs, a feature that is inexplicably missing from Pandora’s software. The increase in competition and the
fundamentally low barriers to entry for the industry have caused content
acquisition costs to skyrocket, and they don’t seem to be slowing down. On top of this, senior management at Pandora decided
that the best idea given these circumstances was to increase marketing instead
of spending money to develop new ideas and innovations in their product. Compared to the $9m increase in marketing
costs for Q2 2012 when compared to Q2 2011, there has only been a $1m increase
in product development costs.
It is also important to remember that Pandora's competitors are not just internet radio companies, but all types of companies that focus on music consumption. Internet radio is simply another method to consume music. If there is a better method, consumers will use that instead. So Pandora's position as the leader in the internet radio industry means nothing.
There
are three possible ways for the company to turn itself around.
1. Benefit
from reduced content acquisition costs. Because
content acquisition costs account for more than 60% of total revenue, reduced
content costs could easily put Pandora in the black. The Internet Radio Fairness Act (HR 6480) was
introduced to congress in late September 2012 that could lower content
acquisition costs. However, even if this
bill were to be passed and implemented in 2014, it would only put internet
radio on the same playing field in terms of content costs as satellite radio or
cable. This will not alleviate the increasing
number of competitors in the internet radio industry.
2. Reduce
marketing costs and focus on product innovation. This is the only way that Pandora will be
able to survive among its newer competitors in a low-barrier industry. As we have seen, Pandora is not doing
this.
3. Tank
enough that large software companies view Pandora as a possible takeover
prospect. This one is also unlikely. Large software companies such as Google and
Apple already have music software that could easily be transitioned into radio
music software, and will be unlikely to pay a high sticker price for Pandora.
VERDICT:
A company must always be viewed with respect to its stock price. A good company at one price may not be a good
buy at another price. However, I believe
Pandora is currently a bad company at any price, with no earnings, no assets,
and no catalyst for change. While
$9/share may seem cheap compared to the $16/share initial offering, it is not
cheap compared to my price target for the company, which is $0/share. It will remain here until one of the three
possible fixes becomes more likely.
J.C. Penney Company, Inc.
Highlights
I. J.C. Penney is performing massive
restructuring under the guidance of its new CEO, Ron Johnson, former Senior VP
of Retail at Apple Inc.
II. With lower profit margins and
higher SG&A costs than their competitors, JCP has room on the upside for
growth.
J.C.
Penney is a chain of American mid-range department stores that operates through
1,106 locations in all 50 U.S. states.
Following a series of disappointing earnings since 2008, former Senior
Vice President of Retail of Apple Inc., Ron Johnson, was appointed the new CEO
of JCP in June, 2011. Since Ron
Johnson’s appointment, earnings have fallen significantly, missing estimates
for both Q1 and Q2 of 2012. Mr. Johnson
has personally invested $50m in JCP shares at $30/share, untouchable for at
least six years.
Part of the earnings disappointment
was due to Ron Johnson’s drastic restructuring of JCP’s business, which
involves removing weekly promotional deals, cutting costs, as well as changing
the physical layout and feel of the stores.
Mr. Johnson felt that JCP’s constant promotions were conditioning JCP’s
customers to both distrust merchandise sticker prices as well as expect constant
discounts. Furthermore, valuable name
brands were hesitant to allow JCP to carry its merchandise in the fears that
such pricing would “cheapen” their brand.
The “store within a store” idea is interesting in the sense that it
could help to eliminate the stigma that may be associated with the JCP
name. After all, when asked where they
got their new coat, a person will never cite the name of the mall they
purchased the coat in, but rather the name of the store or brand. This could help to create a larger
demographic capture of JCP customers. We
have already seen some of this with Sephora, which began openings stores inside
JCP in 2006.
Although JCP is largely under new
management, one has to wonder just how far they can take a retailer that has
traditionally been associated with mid-level discount merchandise. Buying JCP now breaks two of my cardinal
rules:
1. Never catch a falling knife:
Even if JCP is able to turn their business around, there is ample opportunity
to invest during the upturn, as a true change of JCP’s business model in
concert with a true change of perception from consumers will be a long term
trend. Why buy when earnings are
tanking?
2.
Don’t
invest in what you don’t understand: I am unfamiliar with
the specifics of Ron Johnson’s business plan, and what types of customers he is
attempting to attract. As this
restructuring plan is the basic thesis for the JCP bulls, I think upside growth
is very speculative.
I
believe that JCP is fundamentally a different beast than Apple, and Ron
Johnson’s strong track record implementing Apple stores across the nation
belies the fact that Apple products were popular far before this under-taking,
which cannot be said about JCP products, as they are not differentiable from
the products of other retail department stores.
A more apt comparison would be Ron Johnson’s work with Target, a company
that was failing during the early 90s thanks to the advent of stores such as
Wal-Mart. Ron Johnson’s success at
Target was in creating a consumer perception change, transforming Target
products into “cheap-chic” merchandise.
Ron worked with designers and brands to create an image of merchandise
that was not only cheap, but fun and stylish.
To
JCP’s credit, this change in image was also largely unquantifiable, but very
real. What Ron Johnson did for Target,
he could also do for JCP. However, the
company is fundamentally troubling. With
no revenue growth in over a decade, and ignoring the latest quarters of
negative earnings, JCP was still trading at a TTM P/E of 18.1, well above the
industry average. To be certain, JCP is not currently a value play. In terms of assets, JCP owns $888m cash, and
a reported $5.15b in in property and equipment.
We are looking for a turn-around due to drastic restructuring. To Mr. Johnson’s credit, I believe that he
has accurately identified the problems with JCP’s old business model.
JCP’s
profit margin for 2010 was just over 2%, while competitors such as Macys and
Kohl’s showed significantly higher margins for the same period, of 3.4% and 6.1%,
respectively. At the same time, JCP’s
selling, general, and administrative expenses accounted for 30% of net sales in
2011, while Macys’ SG&A accounted for 27% of net sales, and Kohl’s SG&A
only 22% of net sales. If JCP could
match the profit margins of Macys while maintaining its net sales, it could
increase its net income by 60%. The
easiest way to cut costs in order to achieve this desired margin would be
reductions in JCP’s SG&A account, which we see is also a significantly
larger portion of total sales when compared to JCP’s main competitors.
After
recently visiting NYC’s J.C. Penney location within Manhattan Mall on 33rd
and 6th, I believe that a change in floor plan and look could be a
major boon towards the store. Part of
the reason why some retail stores do so well is because shoppers walk into the
store knowing exactly what to expect and what to find. This cannot be said for JCP stores. The floor space is disorganized and
cluttered, and attempting to find something specific is next to
impossible. Ron Johnson’s “store within
store” concept could help to alleviate some of this confusion by segregating
certain types of clothing into their own shops.
That being said, I believe that the products being sold are not outdated
or out of fashion, and seem to be fairly priced. There also seemed to be an overabundance of
greeters, many of whom stood around doing nothing, while a few shouted “J-C-P”
over and over again. I’m unsure if they
were paid to do this or if they were just bored.
Taking a look at JCP’s sales demographic, it’s clear that the department store has been traditionally geared towards older women. In fact, 80% of the store’s sales are made to people ages 30 and up. The new stores, however, do not cater to this demographic, with a brighter look and flashy but stylish shops, Ron Johnson is clearly trying to attract a younger crowd of shoppers. This fundamentally changes who JCP’s competitors are. The question becomes: will JCP be able to compete with the likes of H&M and Uniqlo? Even so, will this new demographic of younger shoppers be enough to outweigh the loss of JCP’s traditional older crowd that have been ostracized? It’s hard to say, on one hand, Johnson made a transition for Target in the mid- 90s that is reminiscent of this one, but on the other, JCP’s hurdles are immense.
VERDICT: I am neutral on JCP because I do not understand what types of customers Ron Johnson’s plan is attempting to attract, but I will continue to monitor sales data for a possible turn-around. What I’ll be looking for is a decrease in JCP’s quarterly SG&A account as well as an increase in net sales, as I believe that one-time restructuring costs will initially hide JCP’s true profit margin gains and keep the stock price deflated, even if Ron Johnson is successful. I will take this opportunity to buy. At this point, all the pieces seem to be in place, but whether or not they’ll move correctly and get the right response from customers is to be determined. Shares of JCP are currently trading at $26.12.
Taking a look at JCP’s sales demographic, it’s clear that the department store has been traditionally geared towards older women. In fact, 80% of the store’s sales are made to people ages 30 and up. The new stores, however, do not cater to this demographic, with a brighter look and flashy but stylish shops, Ron Johnson is clearly trying to attract a younger crowd of shoppers. This fundamentally changes who JCP’s competitors are. The question becomes: will JCP be able to compete with the likes of H&M and Uniqlo? Even so, will this new demographic of younger shoppers be enough to outweigh the loss of JCP’s traditional older crowd that have been ostracized? It’s hard to say, on one hand, Johnson made a transition for Target in the mid- 90s that is reminiscent of this one, but on the other, JCP’s hurdles are immense.
VERDICT: I am neutral on JCP because I do not understand what types of customers Ron Johnson’s plan is attempting to attract, but I will continue to monitor sales data for a possible turn-around. What I’ll be looking for is a decrease in JCP’s quarterly SG&A account as well as an increase in net sales, as I believe that one-time restructuring costs will initially hide JCP’s true profit margin gains and keep the stock price deflated, even if Ron Johnson is successful. I will take this opportunity to buy. At this point, all the pieces seem to be in place, but whether or not they’ll move correctly and get the right response from customers is to be determined. Shares of JCP are currently trading at $26.12.
Yahoo! Inc.
Highlights
I.
Yahoo is fundamentally
undervalued. With a baseline of $7.6b
for its 20% stake in Alibaba, an implied minimum of $15.2b is justified for its
42% stake. Including the $1.5b in cash
the company is holding, we come to a per-share valuation of $14.1/share, or 88%
of today’s closing price ($15.92). This
88% valuation only takes into account one of Yahoo’s current investments, as
well as its free cash.
II.
Yahoo is a likely candidate for a
corporate buyout, as evidenced by interest from Microsoft, Silver Lake, and
Alibaba itself.
III.
Alibaba is more valuable than its
implied $35b valuation from the share repurchase deal with Yahoo. Yahoo will continue to hold its remaining 22%
stake in Alibaba.
As of September, Alibaba has repurchased
20% of Yahoo’s 40% stake in its company for $7.6b, of which $800m was paid for
in preferred stock in Alibaba Group, translating to roughly $4.3b in net cash
proceeds for Yahoo after tax. This $7.6b
amount implies a valuation for Alibaba at roughly $35b. This is also an indication that Alibaba Group
may be looking to IPO in the near future, at which point Yahoo will be allowed
to sell its remaining 20% of the shares to both Alibaba and the open
market. Inflation of repurchase prices
can be expected as Alibaba comes closer to IPO.
Q2 data suggests that Yahoo! Inc. is planning to hold on to the
repurchase money and invest in itself instead of paying shareholders. This cash boost may be just what Yahoo needs
to reverse its slow decline.
With a $7.6b cash payoff as the
baseline, Yahoo would stand to benefit greatly from a prospective Alibaba
IPO. Alibaba itself has shown tremendous
revenues growth the past year towards the tune of 76% YOY growth for the 6
months ended March 31st. From
a fundamental standpoint, owning 20% of the shares of a company means you own
20% of the company, and therefore 20% of the company’s earnings, and with $220m
in earnings in Q1 2012, Alibaba’s earnings match those of Yahoo itself. Shares of Yahoo have jumped from $15 in early
September to $15.70 as of today, a 4.6% increase that I do not believe captures
the increasing value of Yahoo’s 20% ownership in Alibaba. Needless to say, Alibaba wants Yahoo’s 20%
stake back, and Yahoo does not want to sell.
Although Yahoo has agreed to sell half of its 20% stake back to Alibaba
when the latter declares IPO, the price for these shares has yet to be
determined.
Furthermore, there is a chance that
Yahoo is being screened for a buyout not only by Microsoft, who launched a
tender offer for the company at $31 per share in 2008, but by Alibaba Group
itself. According to Alibaba CEO and Chairman
Jack Ma back in 2011, “We are very interested in Yahoo. Our Alibaba group is important to Yahoo, and
Yahoo is important to us…All the serious buyers interested in Yahoo have talked
to us.”[1] By the end of 2011, Alibaba had hired a
Washington DC lobbying firm as well as a Law firm, both of which specialize in
cross-borders M&A. Now may be the best strategic opportunity for Alibaba to
acquire Yahoo, as it can avoid buying back Yahoo’s 20% stake in Alibaba at
inflated prices prior to its IPO. Even
if this acquisition does not happen, Yahoo still stands to gain from its divestiture
of Alibaba stock. s
Yahoo’s investments in
equity interests account for more than 68% of Yahoo’s net income.
As
of today, this data from Q1 2012 is outdated.
It can be expected that half of Alibaba Group’s carrying value will be
removed, with a $4.3b credit to cash and cash equivalents. Yahoo accounts for its investments using the
equity method, meaning that a proportion of Alibaba and Yahoo Japan’s net
income is reported as income for Yahoo.
This proportion is equal to Yahoo’s stake in the respective companies. This means that of the $220m net income
reported by Alibaba group in Q1 2012, $88m was added to Yahoo’s bottom line in
Q2 2012. Assuming conservatively that
Alibaba has no earnings growth, Yahoo could stand to see a $44m decline in net
income for the next quarter, or a decline of roughly 24% given no earnings
growth.
With projected earnings for Q3 2012
of $0.26 per share, translating to roughly $308m in net income with 1.2b share
outstanding, Yahoo is set for a large earnings miss. However, this may be the perfect time to buy
the company cheap, if the stock price moves to reflect its earnings
adjustments. We know that the cash is
being used to develop and restructure the Yahoo business model under the new
CEO, Marissa Mayer, and that Yahoo is still a likely candidate for a buyout. The question is whether or not Yahoo will
distribute this earnings shock among several quarters, which is likely.
VERDICT: Taking Yahoo’s $7.6b as a baseline,
the implied valuation of Yahoo’s assets in Alibaba is roughly $15.2b, or $12.8
per share. If we take into account
Yahoo’s cash holdings of $1.5b, this translates to an asset valuation of $14.1
per share, or 88% of today’s (10/16/12) price.
From a fundamental standpoint, Yahoo is undervalued based almost solely
on the value of its assets.
Technical Analysis
Technical analysis shows that the
stock is trading below the average of its Bollinger Band, with a Fast
Stochastic that has already crossed upwards and a MACD histogram that shows
movement towards moving average convergence.
There have been no high volume intra-day reversals yet, so a rally seems
unlikely in the near future.
· Yahoo! Inc. Ratios (2011)
o
Current Ratio: 3.04
o
Debt to Equity Ratio: 0.17
o
Return on Assets: 3.52
o
Return on Equity: 4.12
·
Alibaba Group Ratios (2011)
o
Current Ratio: 2.41
o
Debt to Equity Ratio: 0.37
o
Return on Assets: 6.10
o
Return on Equity: 8.37
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