Highlights
I.
Pandora may seem cheap, but the
company has no history of earnings, no real assets, and no compelling story for
a turnaround.
When Pandora IPO’d back in June of
2011, I told my college investment club that there was a mini tech bubble occurring
within the recent slew of internet company IPOs, most notably Facebook and
Zynga. Since its initial $16/share price
valuation, the stock has plummeted to $9/share as of today (10/22/12), with
significant institutional sell-offs in March and late August of 2012.
Pandora’s business model is simple: users on a computer or mobile device can
create music “stations” by entering an artist or song name. Free users experience both audio and video
ads, interspersed between songs. Paid
users do not. Pandora’s two main streams
of revenue are ads revenue, and subscriptions revenue.
Because Pandora has only recently
become a public company, there is a lack of credible annual data. However, because Pandora is not a seasonal
company, I felt comfortable comparing consecutive quarterlies. To be certain, Pandora is not a value
play. With no record of positive net
income, the company has been losing money since IPO. Pandora’s current ratio is 1.91 with a debt:
equity ratio of 0.96, so there should be no liquidity problems.
The two main problems for Pandora’s
bottom line are content acquisition costs, which have increased almost 100% year
to year for Q2 since 2011, and marketing and sales, which have increased
roughly 62% for the same time period. For
the extra $36m that Pandora has spent on these two accounts during Q2 2012 as compared to Q2 2011, the
company has seen an increase in total revenue of only $34.4m. Fundamentally, these two problems are symptoms
of much larger problems.
Pandora
owns no physical assets, and is specialized based on its music selection
algorithm, which admittedly is pretty good.
However, this is not enough of a niche for Pandora to be completely
diversified from competitors such as iTunes and Spotify. In fact, free users of Spotify can listen
directly to the songs they want to instead of creating stations around the
songs, a feature that is inexplicably missing from Pandora’s software. The increase in competition and the
fundamentally low barriers to entry for the industry have caused content
acquisition costs to skyrocket, and they don’t seem to be slowing down. On top of this, senior management at Pandora decided
that the best idea given these circumstances was to increase marketing instead
of spending money to develop new ideas and innovations in their product. Compared to the $9m increase in marketing
costs for Q2 2012 when compared to Q2 2011, there has only been a $1m increase
in product development costs.
It is also important to remember that Pandora's competitors are not just internet radio companies, but all types of companies that focus on music consumption. Internet radio is simply another method to consume music. If there is a better method, consumers will use that instead. So Pandora's position as the leader in the internet radio industry means nothing.
There
are three possible ways for the company to turn itself around.
1. Benefit
from reduced content acquisition costs. Because
content acquisition costs account for more than 60% of total revenue, reduced
content costs could easily put Pandora in the black. The Internet Radio Fairness Act (HR 6480) was
introduced to congress in late September 2012 that could lower content
acquisition costs. However, even if this
bill were to be passed and implemented in 2014, it would only put internet
radio on the same playing field in terms of content costs as satellite radio or
cable. This will not alleviate the increasing
number of competitors in the internet radio industry.
2. Reduce
marketing costs and focus on product innovation. This is the only way that Pandora will be
able to survive among its newer competitors in a low-barrier industry. As we have seen, Pandora is not doing
this.
3. Tank
enough that large software companies view Pandora as a possible takeover
prospect. This one is also unlikely. Large software companies such as Google and
Apple already have music software that could easily be transitioned into radio
music software, and will be unlikely to pay a high sticker price for Pandora.
VERDICT:
A company must always be viewed with respect to its stock price. A good company at one price may not be a good
buy at another price. However, I believe
Pandora is currently a bad company at any price, with no earnings, no assets,
and no catalyst for change. While
$9/share may seem cheap compared to the $16/share initial offering, it is not
cheap compared to my price target for the company, which is $0/share. It will remain here until one of the three
possible fixes becomes more likely.
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